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An Oligopoly Analysis of AT&T's
Performance in the Wireline Long-
Distance Markets After Divestiture
Paul W. MacAvoy*
Having been present at the creation of "divestiture," as the next
witness for the defense scheduled to be called before the court, the day
after the surprise settlement, and therefore never heard, I had a seat at the
table to listen to what was to be forthcoming. It was evident to me that
AT&T management expected to become the dominant long-distance (LD)
wireline service provider in nationwide business and residential markets,
free of price controls of the FCC. The Antitrust Division never said that LD
divestiture from the local exchange companies was expected to result in
effective LD competition. Instead, the divestiture process plus open entry
in LD markets was meant to create as many LD carriers operating as far
away from regulation as possible in numerous duplicative carrier
networks.' But the Antitrust Division made no connection between
numbers of networks and competition among LD service suppliers.
The antitrust court, Judge Greene's district court, had plans to manage
the process of creating duplicative national networks. The local exchange
companies were forced to build out their interconnection nodes to provide
parity for all old and new LD carriers in picking up and delivering calls. In
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1. See Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T
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the transition period before parity was achieved, beginning in 1984, the
regulated charges for interconnection favored the other carriers, and these
new carriers then expanded relative to AT&T. AT&T lost a third of its 90%
plus share of call revenues, in both national residence and business service
markets. Accounting for revenue shares of AT&T, and the entrants MCI
and Sprint, with then-comparable national service offerings, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) fell from close to 0.9, indicative of a
market structure in which there were 1.1 firms, to 0.5, similar to that for
two equally sized firms by the end of the first dozen years of the court
remedy process.2 The prices in AT&T's tariff were still subject to caps set
by the FCC, because AT&T was still defined as a "dominant firm" by the
FCC while MCI and Sprint were not. While the caps were seldom limiting,
the FCC process allowed the three carriers to set the same prices; AT&T
submitted its tariff to the FCC as required and the other two followed
voluntarily.
The Judge Greene court, in effect, was implementing the regulatory
reform programs of the Ford and Carter Administrations in the other
network industries. These programs: (a) separated ownership of the product
at the entry node from transport services from that node to the exit node,
and (b) regulated prices for link and node utilization where there were open
entry "bottlenecks." By legislation or agency rulemaking, the gas networks
or power grids were restructured into newly defined, open-entry regional
markets subject to price caps at key nodes. These partial deregulatory
policies proceeded through the mid 1980s to the late 1990s changing only
to add auction markets in place of some price controls. The Greene court's
antitrust policy in the AT&T divestiture went in this direction.
The AT&T revenue share from wireline services declined by 2% to
5% per year from 1984 to 1991, then stabilized at 65%, which held, plus or
minus 1%, until 1997.3 To lose a third of total revenue share in any of these
network industries presaged a decline in price relative to the costs of
service. In fact, both residential and business LD charges declined, but so
did the (regulated) interexchange switching charges that constituted the
largest share of LD costs. Wireline LD prices for services throughout the
country went down, but not by as much as did marginal costs for these
services in this fifteen year period. Price net of marginal cost, as a
percentage of price,-the Lerner Index in oligopoly theory-increased on
standard plan services to an amount in excess of 60%. Even on discount
2. See PAUL W. MAcAvOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO
ESTABLISH CoMPETITIoN IN LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 131 (1966); C.f PAUL W.
MAcAvoy, THE UNSUSTAINABLE COSTS OF PARTIAL DEREGULATION (2007).
3. See MAcAvoY, UNSUSTAINABLE COSTS, supra note 2.
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plans-contracts for service to which large numbers of residential
subscribers were switching-these margins increased from 65% to 68%.
The AT&T share of wireline revenues, which was close to two-thirds,
ceased declining in the 1990s, while shares of the two other firmly
established carriers with national networks, MCI and Sprint, ceased
increasing. Demand functions were negatively sloped for the two main
residential services, standard and discount, with elasticities less than one.
The high and increasing price-cost (Lerner) margins were not indicative of
competitive pricing; they were too high, and were increasing after market
shares stabilized. Demands for business services were highly interactive,
with change in prices and service packages customized to lure large
corporate clients. These patterns of interactive prices and fast-changing
service packages did not fit those of a competitive pricing system either.
If not competitive, then what? The market structure was characterized
by one large carrier and two others, each able to provide full service of a
national scale, essentially that of an oligopoly. There were not enough
different sources of comparable service, by construct, "two" according to
the HHI, to force price levels down to the near-zero competitive Lerner
margin. There were limited price differences, mostly associated with
discount packages for AT&T and MCI, but Sprint copied the prices in
AT&T's tariff. Then the "what" question becomes, what kind of oligopoly?
With tariffs at the FCC putting in place one-shot price schedules that held
for most of a year, the "kind" or "classification" of oligopoly was Cournot,
which implied that an HHI equivalent of two firms would result in a Lerner
Index half of that with an LD monopoly.
Consider that these pricing margins were in fact the result of a
concerted Cournot strategy; the Lerner Index would be the product of
market share multiplied by the "strategic factor," divided by the market
demand elasticity. That factor, the coefficient of conjectural variation, V,
determined that repetitive responses of the two smaller network service
providers would either complement (V = +1) or substitute (V = -1) for
service initiatives of AT&T. Complementary responses, to every change in
AT&T's service offerings, produced "defined" Cournot margins.
Substituting responses, in which the two followers increased service when
AT&T reduced service, renders the Lerner margin convergent to zero, the
replication of "competitive pricing." 5
The changes in Lerner margins from the mid 1980s to 1997 were
neither largely positive nor negative. The second and third carriers did not
4. See id.
5. With the conventional profit maximizing model, for firm i, in which product levels
qi and qj are interactive, then first order conditions for Lerner "L" or price-cost margin for
firm ",' (pi-ci)/pl=[(qi/Q)(+V)]/e.
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follow in lock step to undercut AT&T, nor did they provide the expansive
support necessary to allow AT&T to set tariff prices at monopoly levels.
From year to year, the AT&T conjectural variation ranged from 0 to -0.3,
values associated with setting out a strategy to disregard the responses of
the other two providers. But the large service provider was not able to
totally ignore the others over this long period of time. The Lerner margin,
even though increasing, was too low-by 20 0/--and the elasticity of
demand was not sufficiently large (negative), to validate a strategy of
monopoly.
In 1996, with passage of the Telecommunications Act, the framework
in which AT&T set its strategic pricing changed. The last vestiges of tariffs
disappeared for the three carriers, rendering it difficult for the largest
carrier to take the lead in the continued pattern of reductions in conjectural
variation, which were small. The merchandising practices of the companies
to stabilize Cournot turned to simplification of pricing with announcements
of "cents per minute" packages containing some featured services. The
mechanics for knowing what all the major providers were doing, sufficient
to practice Cournot, were still maintained by simplifying the tariff.
However, there were other determinants of price formation moving
against stable to increasing price cost margins. The rapid expansion of cell
phone service, not only by the three carriers, but also by at least three
independent service providers, provided the option for both commercial
and residential customers to shift out of wireline services at prices lower or
comparable to those of discount LD service packages. The price elasticity
of wireline service demands was increasing from a range of -0.7 to more
than -1.1 in the few field tests made in that period. Greater price sensitivity
and difficulty in preventing shifting to other wireless service providers put
pressure on the Cournot strategy.
Even so, significant pressure was exerted by the FCC in implementing
the Telecommunications Act for the three wireline carriers to increase
Lerner margins extensively. The new funds necessary to provide universal
service to be collected from LD service subscribers called for increasing
price-cost margins to "pass through" a universal funds "tax." However,
with Cournot pricing these carriers had to absorb some percentage of the
tax and would be left in too weak of a profit position to sustain services, let
alone expand the long-called-for broadband access, or so they argued.
This argument of the carriers on "pass through" was logically sound.
A continuation of Cournot would require a 2% to 4% reduction in Lerner
margins to collect a 10% universal service tax. Only a more collusive
pricing arrangement would result in the larger cash flow necessary to cover
a 10% surcharge.
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In this post Telecommunications Act period, from 1997 to 2004,
AT&T's Lerner margins increased from 60% to the low 90% range for
standard residential service, a rapidly declining class of service. AT&T's
Lerner margins on discount plan services also increased, but by much less,
on this increasing class of service. The Lerner Index estimates were in
excess of those consistent with Cournot without pass-through of the
Universal Service Fund (USF) charges levied by the FCC. There was an
opportunity provided by USF recovery plans, fostered by the FCC, to
jointly increase prices more collusively. That all three carriers succeeded in
more than full USF recovery from increased Lerner margins was indicated
by an FCC order limiting recovery surcharges to the required contribution.6
Did AT&T, in this last stage of its existence, conspire with the FCC to
set LD joint monopoly prices? Its Lerner Index values clearly resulted from
a new collective strategy (i.e., a value of V>o). In most years, the estimate
of conjectural variation increased to greater than 1.0, indicative of a joint
strategy to set the price level. Given a market share of 0.4 and the Lerner
Index at 0.88, the conjectural variation coefficient had to exceed 1.5 for
monopoly. 7 In line with the 1997-2004 data, the average V equaled 1.2 for
standard plan wireline and 0.9 for discount plans in place. In standard plan
service, while that service was in decline, AT&T had prices approaching
monopoly levels. While in discount plans, where price-sensitive customers
migrated to wireless in large numbers, prices were not at those levels.
In a November 2005 speech to the people of AT&T, the CEO
expressed the current condition succinctly, saying, "the old business we
had worked fine with much higher price levels" leaving out the words
"standard plan," but noting that with the shift out of old business to
discount plans and wireless, "we have serious trouble given the direction
prices [are] headed." He put it another way that was even more
illuminating, "our customers needed what we provided them, but
competitive price levels made it impossible for us to make a profit with the
cost structure." What the customers "needed" were "new service offerings
to create new revenue streams." 8 Broadband waited to be funded, and only
monopoly level prices inclusive of the tax would provide those funds.
In the twenty years from 1984 to 2004, the court-initiated
implementation process was intended first to structurally separate local
acquisition of calls from LD delivery, and second to add to the number of
6. Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order and Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 24952, paras. 40-63 (2002).
7. With the Lerner Index of 0.88 in residential service markets, demand elasticity of
1.1 and market share of firm i, AT&T, equal to qilQ=0.40 then 0.88=0.40 (I+ )/1.1 and the
estimated V=1.2 The monopoly value of V is the solution of S,{I+P)l which here is 1.5.
8. David W. Dorman, CEO, AT&T, Corp., Speech to AT&T (Nov. 2005).
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networks independent of AT&T. Whether this was ever expected to result
in competitive market performance is unknown. By 2004, specialized
common carriers and wireless service providers had achieved the structural
part, but with either Coumot oligopoly prices, or with the FCC "inspired"
joint tax for monopoly pricing. At that point in time, an industry-wide
reversal of this structural condition took place, a merger which sent AT&T
back into providing local exchanges, and caused other local operating
companies to attach to the leading wireless companies. That series of
mergers reversed direction against the structural goals of the 1984 antitrust
court and the Justice Department.
This structural reversal brought the case for a divestiture antitrust
remedy to an end. At least in this industry, and perhaps in others, the
structured fragmentation goal was shelved. There are at least three results
from there: (1) the court's resorting in complex antitrust proceedings to
settlement between the parties does not remake market structures consistent
with the competitive model; (2) conditions of scale and scope inherent in
networks work against structural remedies seeking to set a dozen service
providers in markets; and (3) specific to bottleneck price controls, provide
a compelling incentive for introducing bundled services that make it
impossible to use price to monitor performance.
In light of these current conditions, after numerous papers and books
on oligopoly and regulation, this is my last inquiry into antitrust and
regulation in telecommunications. I cannot work without being able to
define markets and prices, to unravel industry performance; and that is no
longer possible. One can no longer tell what the oligopoly is doing.
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